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S PrucPural reforms in Phe euro area: A Greek view 
Michael G. Arghyrou
1
 
 
AbsPracP  E venPs in recenP years have puP Phe E uropean economic inPegraPion projecP 
and Phe euro under pressure. The main cause of Phe euro crisis is loss of 
compePiPiveness, parPicularly on Phe periphery of Phe E conomic and MonePary Union. 
To reverse Phis, Union members musP promoPe sPrucPural reforms PhaP increase long-
Perm employmenP, producPiviPy and exPernal compePiPiveness. The successful 
implemenPaPion of reforms, however, requires sufficienP public supporP, which in Purn 
presupposes measures PhaP supporP demand during Phe implemenPaPion of reforms. 
To PhaP end, imporPanP sPeps include Paking an expendiPure-based approach Po fiscal 
adjusPmenP and Phe inProducPion of Phe E uropean GeposiP Insurance S cheme. And for 
Greece in parPicular, Phe seP of necessary sPeps includes Paking ownership of reforms, 
Phe downward revision of fiscal PargePs, and medium- and long-Perm measures of debP 
relief condiPional upon meePing fiscal/reform PargePs. F inally, Phe sPabiliPy of Phe euro 
hinges on Phe moderaPion of all fiscal and exPernal imbalances across all member 
sPaPes, regardless of whePher Phese imbalances are apparenP or noP. 
 
K eywords  E conomic and MonePary Union – Greece – S PrucPural reforms – Gemand 
– E xpecPaPions – E uropean GeposiP Insurance S cheme – Primary surplus – GebP relief  
 
InProducPion  
 
The E uropean economic inPegraPion projecP is a cornersPone of lasPing peace for Phe 
E uropean conPinenP. This is sufficienP reason Po advocaPe sProngly for iPs conPinuaPion. 
NeverPheless, evenPs in recenP years have puP iP under pressure. The mosP prominenP 
manifesPaPion of Phis has been Phe UK’s decision Po leave Phe E U. In oPher counPries, 
populisP and/or exPremisP anPi-E U parPies have made elecPoral advances; and even 
voPers for mainsPream pro-E U parPies reporP increasing dissaPisfacPion wiPh Phe E U 
(Oliver 2016).  
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While each counPry has idiosyncraPic feaPures conPribuPing Po Phe increasing prevalence 
of E uroscepPicism, Phere are Pwo common economic facPors. The firsP is Phe effecPs of 
globalisaPion on world income disPribuPion (see Milanovic 2016). Guring 1988–2008 
average global income increased and Phe variance in income disPribuPion declined. 
However, individuals who in 1988 were placed bePween Phe disPribuPion’s 7D
Ph
 and 8D
Ph
 
percenPile experienced income sPagnaPion or reducPion. S evenPy per cenP of Phe people 
in Phis caPegory are residenPs of WesPern counPries occupying places in Phe lower half 
of Pheir naPion’s income disPribuPion. The sPagnaPion/decline of Pheir living sPandards, 
combined wiPh large income gains for Phe Pop percenPile, which is associaPed wiPh 
poliPical and economic eliPes, have lefP large secPions of E uropean sociePies wiPh a 
sense of insecuriPy and injusPice. This provides ground for populisP/exPremisP parPies Po 
claim PhaP reversing globalisaPion will be enough Po resPore Phe previous norm. In Phis 
over-simplisPic analysis Phe E U is idenPified wiPh globalisaPion and Phus receives 
reduced endorsemenP.  
 
The second facPor is Phe E uropean debP crisis, which has divided Phe euro area inPo 
Pwo groups. The firsP includes debPor counPries PhaP have been cuP off from inPernaPional 
bond markePs and, as a resulP, have received official financial assisPance condiPional 
upon implemenPing programmes of economic adjusPmenP. Greece is Phe mosP 
prominenP example of Phis group. The second group includes crediPor counPries, which 
have underwriPPen Phe assisPance programmes provided Po Phe firsP. In counPries such 
as Greece dissaPisfacPion wiPh Phe E U is driven by Phe adverse effecPs on welfare of 
adjusPmenP programmes and a sense of reduced naPional sovereignPy due Po Phe direcP 
involvemenP of Phe E U and oPher inPernaPional bodies (e.g. Phe InPernaPional MonePary 
Fund) in naPional economic policy. In crediPor counPries, dissaPisfacPion is Phe resulP of 
a sense of Phe involunPary use of naPional and privaPe savings Po rescue E conomic and 
MonePary Union (E MU) parPners PhaP are perceived as imprudenP. S ParPing from 
opposiPe reference poinPs, public opinion in boPh groups converges on a common 
ground: E uroscepPicism.  
 
The Pwo facPors explained above are noP unrelaPed. They share a common economic 
source, namely compePiPiveness losses in many E MU economies, parPicularly Phose 
on Phe periphery. These losses will noP be reversed if Phe E MU embarks upon a 
proPecPionisP course and/or some E MU counPries leave Phe euro. E conomic Pheory and 
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hisPorical experience Pell us PhaP free Prade promoPes producPion efficiency and welfare 
sPandards, and living sPandards in Phe long run are dePermined by an economy’s 
producPion capaciPy, PhaP is, iPs supply side, on which monePary policy has no lasPing 
impacP. The only credible answer Po E urope’s economic and poliPical problems is 
sPrucPural reform, and iP is on Phis PhaP Phe euro’s susPainabiliPy ulPimaPely depends.  
 
Having said PhaP, inPernaPional experience also Pells us PhaP a successful programme 
of reforms requires Phe supporP of a criPical mass of Phe populaPion. For Phis Po be in 
place Phe laPPer musP perceive reforms Po be beneficial and realisPic, PhaP is, Pheir 
adjusPmenP welfare cosP should noP be regarded as socially unPenable. This, in Purn, 
presupposes PhaP unPil reforms yield posiPive ouPpuP effecPs, economic acPiviPy is 
adequaPely supporPed by Phe demand side. WiPh an emphasis on Greece, Phis arPicle 
discusses Phe reforms necessary in Phe E MU counPries and analyses Phe demand-
supporPing condiPions PhaP would enable Pheir successful conclusion.  
 
S PrucPural reforms  
 
GespiPe evidence of increased economic convergence among E MU members since 
1999, Phe E MU conPinues Po be divided bePween a core and a periphery (Campos and 
Macchiarelli 2016), deviaPing from Phe condiPions seP by Phe Pheory of opPimum currency 
areas for Phe smooPh operaPion of a single currency. The core–periphery divide is 
manifesPed in per capiPa income sPaPisPics (see F igure 1) and was highlighPed during 
Phe crisis, when periphery counPries experienced significanPly higher ouPpuP losses. 
The policy implicaPion of Phis experience is unconProversial: for periphery counPries Po 
caPch up wiPh Pheir core parPners and upgrade Pheir economy’s capaciPy Po wiPhsPand 
fuPure crises, Phey need Po promoPe supply-side policies PhaP enhance Pheir economies’ 
flexibiliPy, exPernal compePiPiveness and producPion capaciPy (naPural ouPpuP).  
 
Modern macroeconomics (see CorsePPi and PesenPi 2009) suggesPs PhaP naPural ouPpuP 
increases wiPh long-Perm employmenP and producPiviPy levels, while compePiPiveness 
gains involve a reducPion of goods and services prices relaPive Po Phose of Prading 
parPners. Long-Perm employmenP is a funcPion of boPh compePiPion in Phe goods and 
services markePs and Phe qualiPy of human capiPal. ProducPiviPy depends on human 
capiPal and capiPal invesPmenP, for which insPiPuPional performance across a range of 
4 
 
areas (e.g. PaxaPion, poliPical sPabiliPy, Phe rule of law and proPecPing properPy righPs) is 
of crucial imporPance. F inally, exPernal compePiPiveness increases wiPh lower marginal 
producPion cosPs and lower mark-ups on marginal cosPs. The laPPer, in Purn, are 
dePermined by Phe degree of compePiPion in Phe goods and services markePs, non-
labour cosPs and indirecP PaxaPion. All of Phe above should be Pop policy prioriPies for 
E MU counPries Po engage wiPh in fuPure years. The example of Ireland shows PhaP 
puPPing in place a flexible, insPiPuPionally credible and friendly-Po-business environmenP 
creaPes long-Perm ouPpuP gains, an abiliPy Po quickly overcome crises and a more equal 
disPribuPion of income.  
 
Ireland’s experience is Phe mosP relevanP for Greece, Phe counPry presenPing Phe 
biggesP poPenPial for supply-side improvemenPs in Phe E MU area, as suggesPed by iPs 
posiPion in numerous inPernaPional rankings relaPing Po supply-side performance. On 
Phis fronP, Greece made significanP progress in Phe period 2012–14 (see Arghyrou 
2014). In 201D–16, however, Phis progress ended. The sPagnaPion in which Phe Greek 
economy currenPly finds iPself highlighPs Phe imporPance of resuming Phe process of 
reform.  
 
S upporPing reforms Phrough demand  
 
S PrucPural reforms cause immediaPe welfare losses Po be offseP by higher benefiPs in 
Phe fuPure. This is why reforms should be pursued during periods of growPh, Po 
moderaPe Pheir shorP-Perm welfare impacP. UnforPunaPely, poliPical consideraPions ofPen 
geP in Phe way, resulPing in reforms being pursued during recessions when 
accumulaPed imbalances make Pheir implemenPaPion urgenP. The experience of Phe 
E uropean periphery is a prime example. BuP bygones are bygones. E uropean 
economies musP now move on wiPh reforms. In Phis efforP, Pheir prospecPs for success 
will improve subsPanPially if demand condiPions are as supporPive as Phey can be during 
Phe implemenPaPion of reforms. To PhaP end, Phe following facPors are imporPanP.  
  
OpPimal prioriPisaPion  
 
To maximise Pheir effecPiveness, reforms should be opPimally prioriPised. E xisPing 
liPeraPure (see OE CG 2016) suggesPs PhaP in periods of low demand, prioriPy should be 
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given Po reforms PhaP remove barriers Po enPry in Phe goods and services markePs and 
Po Phose PhaP increase labour mobiliPy. In addiPion Po increasing naPural ouPpuP, such 
reforms have a posiPive effecP on demand, increasing disposable incomes and Phe 
endorsemenP of reforms by Phe general public. In Phe conPexP of Phe E MU, and as Phe 
Pheory of opPimum currency areas suggesPs, flexible goods and labour markePs are 
even more imporPanP for closing ouPpuP gaps due Po Phe absence of naPional monePary 
policies. FurPhermore, in a low demand siPuaPion reforms faciliPaPing infrasPrucPure 
invesPmenP are also imporPanP for susPaining incomes. E U financing, available Phrough 
E uropean S PrucPural Funds, Phe E uropean Fund for S PraPegic InvesPmenP, Phe 
E uropean InvesPmenP Bank, and Phe E uropean Bank for R econsPrucPion and 
GevelopmenP, provides such opporPuniPies. In Phe parPicular case of Greece, financing 
from Phese sources is gradually gaPhering momenPum. This is a posiPive developmenP; 
however, on iPs own iP is noP enough Po address Greece’s long-Perm supply and shorP-
Perm demand problems.  
 
Favourable expecPaPions  
 
Gemand condiPions depend on Phe regime of expecPaPions under which reforms are 
implemenPed. High confidence in Phe successful conclusion of reforms acceleraPes 
posiPive privaPe responses Po reform policies (Phrough invesPmenP and consumpPion), 
Priggering a virPuous circle of muPually enforcing expecPaPions, increased demand and 
endorsemenP of reforms. Low confidence causes Phe opposiPe dynamics.  
 
Improving expecPaPions depends on Pwo facPors. The firsP of Phese is Phe naPional 
auPhoriPies Paking ownership of Phe reforms. A lack of ownership causes 
implemenPaPion risk, resPricPing invesPmenP and consumpPion spending, which 
compromises Phe endorsemenP of reforms and reinforces implemenPaPion risk. E MU 
counPries whose auPhoriPies Pook ownership of reforms (Ireland, PorPugal and Cyprus) 
have concluded Pheir assisPance programmes successfully and rePurned Po posiPive 
growPh. In Greece, when ownership of Phe reforms has been absenP, bePween 2009–
11 and 201D Po presenP, economic developmenPs have been negaPive. By conPrasP, in 
2012–14, when auPhoriPies assumed ownership of Phe reforms, Phe economy made 
significanP progress (see Arghyrou 2014).  
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S econd, credible crisis-prevenPion and crisis-managemenP mechanisms are needed 
aP Phe E MU level. These are necessary Po reassure markePs PhaP Phe probabiliPy of 
major naPional banking and fiscal crises is limiPed and PhaP, if Phey happen, Phey will noP 
spread Po Phe economy’s real secPor and/or Po oPher counPries. To PhaP end, a number 
of insPiPuPional changes have Paken place, including Phe creaPion of a new macro-
prudenPial framework, risk-sharing fiscal funds (Phe E uropean F inancial S PabiliPy 
FaciliPy and Phe E uropean S PabiliPy Mechanism), Phe OuPrighP MonePary TransacPions 
programme and Phe E uropean Banking Union (E BU), which involves cenPralised bank 
supervision and resoluPion. These are sPeps in Phe righP direcPion, boPh in Perms of 
increasing risk-sharing and reducing moral hazard; however, Phey are noP enough Po 
deliver Phe necessary improvemenP in expecPaPions (see Arghyrou 201Da). This is 
because many decisions conPinue Po be subjecP Po poliPical discrePion and Phe new 
insPiPuPional infrasPrucPure remains incomplePe. This was fully grasped by Phe F ive 
PresidenPs’ R eporP (E uropean Commission 201D) which, among oPhers, highlighPed 
Phe imporPance of complemenPing Phe E BU Phrough Phe inProducPion of a E uropean 
GeposiPs Insurance S cheme (E GIS ) and increased fiscal inPegraPion.  
 
LiquidiPy and E GIS   
 
The imporPance of liquidiPy for business-cycle movemenPs has been well esPablished 
since Phe 1960s, documenPed by Phe wriPings of MilPon Friedman (1963), founder of Phe 
moneParisP school of economics. F igure 2 offers evidence from Greece, depicPing a 
sProng posiPive correlaPion bePween Phe growPh raPes of real GGP and Phe provision of 
bank crediP Po Phe privaPe secPor. AlPhough in Phe long run money is neuPral, iP is a poPenP 
sPabilisaPion Pool for closing negaPive ouPpuP gaps. This approach underlies Phe 
monePary policy followed by Phe E uropean CenPral Bank (E CB) since summer 2007, 
including Phe QuanPiPaPive E asing (QE ) programme implemenPed since J anuary 201D 
(see Graghi 2016), which has conPribuPed Powards ouPpuP sPabilisaPion aP Phe Union 
level (see GemerPzis and Wolff 2016).  
 
The E CB’s expansionary monePary policy, however, has Phree drawbacks. F irsP, iP is 
noP uniformly PransmiPPed, as liquidiPy increases aP Phe core of Phe E MU have been 
considerably higher Phan Phose aP Phe periphery. This is a reflecPion of Phe facP PhaP Phe 
E CB has one policy insPrumenP (Phe Union inPeresP raPe or money supply) and 
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numerous policy objecPives (naPional ouPpuP gaps). As a resulP, Phe single monePary 
policy responds imperfecPly Po naPional business cycles, parPicularly under Phe financial 
fragmenPaPion observed during Phe crisis (E CB 201D). Greece, in parPicular, has been 
isolaPed from Phe QE  programme’s liquidiPy effecPs, as Phe capiPal conProls in place 
since J uly 201D imply PhaP iPs economy is operaPing under a crediP crunch. S econd, Phis 
expansionary policy may PhreaPen financial sPabiliPy by disconnecPing asseP prices from 
fundamenPals (C laeys and Leandro 2016). R ecenP evidence from E uropean sovereign 
bonds markePs (see GelaPPe eP al. 2017) supporPs such concerns. F inally, large 
purchases of sovereign bonds in Phe conPexP of QE  may cause fiscal moral hazard.  
 
These problems may be amelioraPed Phrough Phe inProducPion of E GIS . In cerPain 
counPries E GIS  is regarded wiPh legiPimaPe scepPicism on moral hazard grounds (see 
S chuknechP 2016), alPhough Phis may reflecP naPional raPher Phan E U prioriPies (see 
Véron 2016). E GIS , however, involves shared benefiPs PhaP may offseP such moral 
hazard risks. F irsP, by increasing deposiPors’ confidence in naPional banking sysPems 
(which Phe currenPly incomplePe E BU has failed Po do), E GIS  will enhance crediP-growPh 
capaciPy aP Phe naPional level. This will operaPe as a subsPiPuPe for Phe naPional monePary 
policy insPrumenPs PhaP are missing wiPhin Phe E MU, moderaPing naPional business 
cycles. This, in Purn, will reduce Phe necessiPy for and/or size of official financial 
assisPance programmes and, by supporPing demand, will enhance Phe promoPion of 
reforms. BoPh effecPs will reduce Phe exposure of E uropean Paxpayers Po Phe ouPpuP 
risks of counPries PhaP have received official financial assisPance programmes. 
FurPhermore, by smooPhing naPional business cycles, E GIS  will reduce Phe need for 
ulPra-expansionary monePary policy, which will reduce financial sPabiliPy risks. F inally, 
a less expansionary monePary policy will reduce Phe risk of fiscal moral hazard caused 
by Phe large purchases of sovereign bonds under QE .  
 
F iscal adjusPmenP and debP relief  
 
The E MU crisis has lefP many counPries wiPh excessive public debP levels. This is 
primarily Phe resulP of bank-rescue programmes and, in Phe case of Greece, fiscal 
imbalances builP up in Phe run-up Po Phe crisis. R eforms impacP on Phe economy’s 
naPural ouPpuP Phrough Phe employmenP and invesPmenP responses of Phe privaPe 
secPor. These responses depend on expecPaPions abouP fuPure PaxaPion on income and 
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corporaPe profiPs. For reforms Po be effecPive, PaxaPion expecPaPions need Po be 
favourable. Therefore, reforms musP be accompanied by a credible programme of 
fiscal adjusPmenP, reducing expecPed fuPure PaxaPion. This raises Pwo quesPions. F irsP, 
how should fiscal adjusPmenP be pursued?  S econd, how aggressive should iP be?   
 
F iscal adjusPmenP is widely regarded as causing shorP-Perm conPracPionary ouPpuP 
effecPs. However, exisPing evidence (see Alesina eP al. 201D) suggesPs PhaP Phese are 
more pronounced in size and duraPion when adjusPmenP is pursued Phrough Pax 
increases raPher Phan expendiPure cuPs. An inPuiPive explanaPion is PhaP Pax increases 
reduce employmenP and invesPmenP incenPives and cause oPher supply-side 
disPorPions. These effecPs weaken naPural ouPpuP, reducing expecPaPions and 
suppressing currenP demand. By conPrasP, expendiPure cuPs accompanied by Pax 
reducPions limiP disPorPions and improve ouPpuP expecPaPions. GiscounPing higher fuPure 
ouPpuP in presenP consumpPion and invesPmenP miPigaPes Phe demand effecPs of lower 
governmenP expendiPure. Overall, given Phe supply-side profile of many E MU 
counPries, fiscal consolidaPion is more likely Po be successful if iP is mainly expendiPure- 
raPher Phan Pax-based. This is parPicularly Prue for Greece, where high PaxaPion levels 
(increased subsPanPially in 201D–17) have creaPed high disPorPions and incenPivised 
Pax-evasion (see ArPavanis eP al. 2016).  
 
C learly, a counPry such as Greece, where Phe public debP Po GGP raPio is currenPly in 
Phe range of 180%, musP PargeP primary fiscal surpluses Po improve Phe dynamics of iPs 
governmenP’s inPerPemporal budgeP consPrainP. BuP in addiPion Po Phe primary surplus, 
Phe inPerPemporal budgeP consPrainP depends on Phe sPock of debP and Phe difference 
bePween Phe raPes of growPh and real inPeresP on debP. In recenP years, Greece has 
benefiPed from inPeresP raPe reducPions and exPensions of debP maPuriPy. However, as 
evidenced by Greek long-Perm governmenP bond yields, Phese have noP been enough 
Po resPore confidence in Greece’s public debP susPainabiliPy. The implemenPaPion of 
reforms will help do so. However, Phe laPPer’s ouPpuP effecPs will appear gradually over 
Phe medium Perm. In Phe meanPime, servicing Phe Greek debP involves large paymenPs 
from 2019 onwards. This underlies Phe 3.D% primary surplus seP for Greece’s fiscal 
policy sParPing from 2018 for an unspecified period of Pime. However, Phere are Pwo 
risks associaPed wiPh Phis PargeP. 
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F irsP, hisPorical evidence suggesPs PhaP a 3.D% fiscal surplus was relaPively rare during 
Phe posP-war period of 19D0–2011, when in 7D% of Phe cases primary balances had 
values of less Phan 2.D% and 1.7% for advanced and non-advanced counPries 
respecPively (see Mauro eP al. 2013). E urope has seen Phree episodes of prolonged, 
subsPanPial fiscal surpluses, in Ireland (1987–93), IPaly (199D–2000) and Belgium 
(1994–2004). However, Phere are Pwo major differences bePween Phose episodes and 
Phe siPuaPion in Greece Poday. The firsP is PhaP Phey were implemenPed under 
significanPly more favourable ouPpuP condiPions, involving average ouPpuP gaps equal 
Po +2.8%, -1.9% and -0.4% for Ireland, IPaly and Belgium respecPively. This conPrasPs 
wiPh an ouPpuP gap of -6.D% in 2016 for Greece and an average of -6.9% for Phe period 
2011–16 (InPernaPional MonePary Fund 2016). The second is PhaP in Phose counPries 
naPional monePary policies were sPill in place, providing a channel Po miPigaPe Phe 
demand effecPs of fiscal consolidaPion. This channel is noP available in Greece, whose 
economy, as we have seen above, is operaPing under crediP-crunch condiPions. 
AlPhough Greece needs Po PargeP considerable primary surpluses Po limiP fiscal 
imbalances, Phe 3.D% PargeP is excessive and, given Phe currenP sPaPe of Phe Greek 
business cycle, amounPs Po a fiscal overkill PhaP is very likely Po be self-defeaPing. A 
revision of Phe PargeP Powards Phe Phird quarPile of Phe hisPorical disPribuPion (in Phe range 
of 2%) would sPill seP Greece a relaPively ambiPious fiscal PargeP. R evising Phe fiscal 
PargeP downwards, in Purn, would allow demand condiPions Po bePPer supporP Phe reform 
process, which is much more imporPanP for long-Perm growPh and fiscal susPainabiliPy.  
 
The second risk comes from Phe level of debP. According Po all available projecPions, 
Phe Greek public debP Po GGP raPio will remain very high for Phe foreseeable fuPure. 
E ven if Greece meePs iPs fiscal and reform PargePs, Greek public debP susPainabiliPy will 
be vulnerable Po exPernal shocks causing ouPpuP losses which, in Purn, will PhreaPen 
crediP evenPs. As a resulP, Phe risk premiums associaPed wiPh invesPmenPs in Greece 
will remain high, resPricPing capiPal inflows, discouraging invesPmenP and mainPaining 
high borrowing cosPs, all of which will resPrain growPh. IP is Pherefore necessary Po 
furPher lighPen Phe burden of servicing Phe Greek public debP, as per Phe E urogroup’s 
decision of November 2012, which was confirmed by Phe agreemenP on Phe Greek 
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financial assisPance programme in J uly 201D and Phe E urogroup’s decision of May 
2016.
2
 
 
To achieve Phis objecPive, Phe Greek auPhoriPies musP noP delay delivering on Phe 
commiPmenPs underPaken in Phe conPexP of Phe Phird financial assisPance programme, 
and Greece’s official lenders, in response, should noP delay agreemenP on measures 
PhaP reduce Phe cosP of servicing Phe Greek public debP. These sPeps, however, may be 
difficulP Po conclude due Po Phe presence of a coordinaPion problem. AP presenP, Phe 
measures Po be Paken Po reduce Phe Greek debP burden have noP been confirmed; Phey 
are only a possibiliPy, Po be decided afPer Phe conclusion of Phe Phird Greek programme 
in AugusP 2018. As a resulP, Phe Greek auPhoriPies may be relucPanP Po Pake measures 
involving cerPain and immediaPe welfare losses in exchange for uncerPain gains 
following non-guaranPeed debP-reducPion measures. On Phe oPher hand, due Po moral-
hazard consideraPions, Greece’s parPners may be relucPanP Po commiP Po debP-
reducPion measures wiPhouP evidence of Greece’s commiPmenP Po fiscal adjusPmenP 
and reforms.  
 
The soluPion Po Phis coordinaPion problem may be an agreemenP posPulaPing gradual, 
pre-announced, specific and auPomaPic debP reducPions, condiPional upon Greece 
meePing PargePs relaPing Po fiscal policy and reforms (see Arghyrou 201Db). S uch an 
agreemenP may offer a guide for resolving oPher ouPsPanding debPor–crediPor conflicPs 
wiPhin Phe euro area, as debP relief is noP necessarily a zero-sum game. Using a 
sPandard open-economy framework (see CorsePPi and PesenPi 2009), iP can be shown 
PhaP for debPor counPries debP relief implies consumpPion gains, which increase furPher 
as debP relief faciliPaPes reforms and producPiviPy-enhancing invesPmenP, Phus 
increasing naPural ouPpuP. Higher ouPpuP in debPor counPries reduces Phe prices of Pheir 
goods, improving Phe Perms of Prade wiPh crediPor counPries, whose residenPs consume 
imporPs from debPor counPries. As a resulP, debP relief for Phe laPPer involves 
consumpPion gains for crediPor counPries, compensaPing for Phe consumpPion losses 
caused by granPing debP relief. Benign self-inPeresP may render debP relief condiPional 
upon reforms in a muPually beneficial scheme of crisis-resoluPion.  
 
                                                          
2
 S ee E urogroup (2012; 201D and 2016).  
11 
 
Conclusion 
 
This arPicle has discussed Phe reforms PhaP have Po be underPaken in E MU counPries Po 
ensure Phe sPabiliPy and long-Perm susPainabiliPy of Phe euro. IP has also explained Phe 
sPeps needed Po supporP demand during Phe implemenPaPion of reforms, Phus enabling 
Pheir successful conclusion. IP has been argued PhaP sPrucPural reforms in Phe E MU 
should PargeP increases in long-Perm employmenP, producPiviPy and exPernal 
compePiPiveness. Gemand measures PhaP supporP reforms include an expendiPure-
based approach Po fiscal adjusPmenP and Phe inProducPion of E GIS . And in Phe case of 
Greece, Phey include ownership of reforms, Phe downward revision of fiscal PargePs, 
and medium- and long-Perm measures of debP relief condiPional upon Phe meePing of 
fiscal/reforms PargePs.  
 
F inally, economic adjusPmenP in Phe euro area requires moderaPion of all fiscal and 
exPernal imbalances across all member sPaPes. WiPhin a monePary union, boPh 
excessive deficiPs and excessive surpluses can cause negaPive exPernaliPies aP Phe 
union level. FurPhermore, any counPry’s parPicipaPion in Phe euro implies PhaP iPs 
sysPemic risk increases by a fracPion of iPs parPners’ sysPemic risk, due Po Phe increased 
inPerdependence broughP abouP by monePary and banking inPegraPion. ImporPed 
sysPemic risk can be reduced, buP iP can never be fully eliminaPed. This is why Phe euro 
area needs effecPive risk-reducPion and risk-sharing mechanisms, boPh of which are 
equally imporPanP in Phe long run. The sPabiliPy of Phe euro will improve subsPanPially if 
all naPional economic policies are designed wiPh Phese facPs in mind. E uropean 
solidariPy goes hand-in-hand wiPh macroeconomic prudence, and leading by example 
requires naPional macro-policies involving a mix of naPional and Union-wide prioriPies 
PhaP can be susPained by all of Phe member naPions. Prudence and consideraPion for 
Union objecPives are Phe Pwo sides of good E uropean ciPizenship, wiPhouP which Phe 
euro’s long-Perm sPabiliPy cannoP be guaranPeed.  
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F igure 1 Gross domesPic producP based on purchasing-power pariPy per capiPa GGP, US  dollars in 201D 
 
 
S ource: InPernaPional MonePary Fund 2016.  
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F igure 2 GrowPh raPes for real GGP and bank crediP Po Phe privaPe secPor in Greece  
 
S ources: GGP growPh raPes: InPernaPional MonePary Fund 2017. PrivaPe bank crediP growPh: Bank of Greece 2017. 
NoPe: GGP growPh raPes are measured on Phe lefP verPical axis; bank crediP growPh raPes are measured on Phe righP verPical axis.  
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